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 Extending the Bounds of Rationality:
 Evidence and Theories of
 Preferential Choice
 JORG RIESKAMP, JEROME R. BUSEMEYER, AND BARBARA A. MELLERS*
 Most economists define rationality in terms of consistency principles. These principles
 place "bounds" on rationality-bounds that range from perfect consistency to weak
 stochastic transitivity. Several decades of research on preferential choice has demon-
 strated how and when people violate these bounds. Many of these violations are inter-
 connected and reflect systematic behavioral principles. We discuss the robustness of
 the violations and review the theories that are able to predict them. We further discuss
 the adaptive functions of the violations. From this perspective, choices do more than
 reveal preferences; they also reflect subtle, yet often quite reasonable, dependencies on
 the environment.
 1. Introduction
 Preferences are inherently subjective and
 arise from a mixture of aspirations,
 thoughts, motives, emotions, beliefs, and
 desires. This inherent subjectivity means
 that preferences are not easily evaluated
 against objective criteria without knowledge
 of an individual's goals. For example, it is
 impossible to know whether an individual's
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 preference for chocolate over vanilla ice
 cream is "rational" without knowing the atti-
 tudes, values, perceptions, beliefs, and goals
 of that individual. For this reason, most the-
 orists evaluate the rationality of behavior
 using principles of consistency and coher-
 ence within a system of preferences and
 beliefs.
 The view that rationality only refers to
 internal coherence and logical consistency
 has been sharply criticized on multiple
 grounds. Many have argued (e.g., Gerd
 Gigerenzer 1996a) that consistency princi-
 ples are insufficient for defining rationality.
 If the achievement of an individual's goal
 does not imply consistency, it is questionable
 whether functional behavior that violates
 consistency principles should be called "irra-
 tional." In addition, people are imperfect
 information processors and limited in both
 knowledge and computational capacity.
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 Figure 1. Five Consistency Principles and Their Relatedness
 Herbert A. Simon (1956, 1983) and others
 (Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten 2001) use
 the term bounded rationality to describe
 human behavior. Consistency violations
 might well be adaptive when time, knowl-
 edge, or resources are scarce (e.g., Robert J.
 Aumann 1962; Mark J. Machina 1982;
 Michele Cohen and Jean-Yves Jaffray 1988;
 Gigerenzer 1991, 1996b; Lola L. Lopes and
 Gregg C. Oden 1991; Kenneth R.
 Hammond 1996; Lopes 1996; Philippe
 Mongin 2000).
 Several decades of research on preferential
 choice has led to an impressive body of
 empirical knowledge on how and when peo-
 ple violate consistency principles of preferen-
 tial choice. The purpose of this article is to
 review these basic facts. Our review differs
 from previous reviews (e.g., Paul J. H.
 Schoemaker 1982; Chris Starmer 2000) in
 terms of the consistency principles we exam-
 ine. Previous reviews focused primarily on
 consistency across operations applied to
 properties of choice objects. For example, the
 independence axiom of expected utility theo-
 ry requires consistency across linear transfor-
 mations of probabilities and thus is restricted
 to the domain of decisions under risk. In
 contrast, we are interested in consistency
 principles that go beyond assumptions about
 the properties or attributes of the choice
 objects. For example, the transitivity axiom is
 applicable to a wide range of choice objects,
 including both risky gambles as well as risk
 free commodity bundles.
 We organize our paper around five con-
 sistency principles that are summarized in
 figure 1. Each principle helps to define a
 class of theories. The principles differ in
 type (logically independent principles-one
 principle does not imply anything about
 another), and strength (logically dependent
 principles-a stronger principle implies a
 weaker one). The principles have been
 labeled from I to V, but they only allow a
 partial ordering of constraints.
 The first principle is perfect consistency
 or invariant preferences across occasions.
 Perfect consistency implies the other four
 principles. The second principle, strong sto-
 chastic transitivity, is logically equivalent to
 the third principle, independence from irrel-
 evant alternatives (Amos Tversky and
 Edward J. Russo 1969). Regularity is the
 fourth principle, but there is no logical con-
 nection between independence from irrele-
 vant alternatives and regularity (one does
 not logically imply the other). Independence
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 from irrelevant alternatives implies the fifth
 principle of weak stochastic transitivity.
 A primary goal of this paper is to assess the
 degree to which preferential choices obey
 the principles. For each principle, we sum-
 marize the empirical evidence. When are the
 violations serious and robust? When are they
 small or limited? By evaluating the types of
 violations and the magnitude of those viola-
 tions, we can determine which principles
 must be relaxed in descriptive theories of
 preferential choice. Furthermore, we show
 that many violations are related and suggest
 some underlying behavioral regularities that
 should be addressed in a general descriptive
 theory.
 A secondary goal is to discuss theories of
 preferential choice in terms of the consisten-
 cy principles. We will review classes of theo-
 ries and discuss their compliance or lack of
 compliance with the five consistency princi-
 ples. When evaluating the different theories,
 we will consider the extent to which they can
 describe empirical violations of the consisten-
 cy principles. We will also consider the com-
 plexity of the theories. Selten (1991) argued
 that, if two models are equally successful in
 predicting existing data, the parsimonious
 model that, in principle, is only able to pre-
 dict a small range of data should be preferred
 over the more complex model that, a priori,
 can predict a larger range of data. In a similar
 vein, Mark Pitt, In Jae Myung, and Shaobo
 Zhang (2002) have argued that a model's gen-
 eralizability, or the ability of the model to pre-
 dict independent new data, is essential to
 model selection. A complex model might be
 superior to a simpler model when fitting
 observed behavior, but, due to the danger of
 overfitting, the complex model might be pre-
 dicting noise rather than systematic regulari-
 ties and, therefore, is less suitable for
 predicting new independent behavior.
 A third goal of this paper is to step back and
 reconsider the meaning of rationality. We dis-
 cuss the advantages and disadvantages of each
 principle from different perspectives and
 address the question of how far the bounds of
 rationality must be pushed to accommodate
 basic and systematic regularities in human
 choice.
 2. Perfect Consistency
 The standard utility theory of preference
 begins by positing a choice set, X = {A, B,
 C, ... }, with elements, A, B, and C, denoting
 the options. The choice might involve
 meals, movies, or mutual funds. A prefer-
 ence relation, >W is defined for all pairs of
 options, such that A >_pB means that option
 A is preferred to option B, or that the deci-
 sionmaker is indifferent. Finally, a set of
 axioms is imposed on the preference rela-
 tions to permit the construction of a utility
 function u: X --+ R. The utility function
 assigns a real-valued utility to each option
 (e.g., u(A) is the utility assigned to option
 A), and the order implied by the utilities is
 used to predict the empirical preference
 ordering, that is, u(A) > u(B) if, and only if
 A p B.
 Standard utility theories include the
 expected utility theory (John von Neumann
 and Oskar Morgenstern 1947), rank-
 dependent utility theories (e.g., John
 Quiggin 1982; Chew Soo Hong, Edi Karni,
 and Zvi Safra 1987; Menahem E. Yaari 1987;
 Jerry R. Green and Bruno Jullien 1989; R.
 Duncan Luce 1990), and multiattribute util-
 ity theories (Ralph L. Keeney and Howard
 Raiffa 1976; Detlof von Winterfeldt and
 Ward Edwards 1986). All such theories are
 based on the axiom of transitivity.
 Transitivity states that for any triad of
 options, A, B, and C, if two preferences hold,
 A >p B and B 0, C, then a third one should
 follow, A p C. This axiom is a cornerstone of
 normative and descriptive theories because
 it implies that the utilities can be represent-
 ed as transitive, real numbers (Paul
 Samuelson 1953; Edwards 1954, 1961).
 To test this axiom, one must measure pref-
 erences. There are at least two commonly
 used methods to "elicit" preferences-one
 based on choices and the other based on
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 Judged prices, typically referred to as cer-
 tainty equivalents. Unfortunately, these
 methods do not always agree. For example,
 when presented with a choice between two
 gambles, A and B, individuals may prefer
 gamble A on the basis of choice, but state a
 higher price for gamble B (for reviews, see
 David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott
 1979; Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein
 1983; Tversky, Slovic, and Daniel Kahneman
 1990; Barbara A. Mellers, Shi-Jie Chang,
 Michael H. Birnbaum, and Lisa D. Ordonez
 1992). The psychological reasons for differ-
 ent preferences obtained with different
 response modes are controversial, and there
 is no real consensus about which method is
 better. Both methods of eliciting preferences
 have pros and cons. Nonetheless, many
 researchers prefer to use choices, and for
 this reason, we focus on choice1 (for an alter-
 native perspective, see Luce, Mellers, and
 Chang 1993).
 Differences in measured preferences
 occur not only across methods but also
 across occasions within an individual. In a
 classic study, Frederick Mosteller and Philip
 Nogee (1951) demonstrated that individuals
 were often inconsistent in their preferences
 for simple gambles over repeated occasions.
 Participants were asked to accept or reject
 binary gambles with fixed-outcome proba-
 bilities and increasing amounts to win. The
 tendency for an individual to select the gam-
 ble did not suddenly jump from zero to one
 at an acceptable winning payoff. Instead,
 acceptance frequencies were a smooth S-
 shaped function when plotted against the
 winning amount. The preference function
 was strikingly similar to a psychometric func-
 tion, such as those derived from the discrim-
 ination of stimuli along psychophysical
 continuua, such as loudness, heaviness, and
 brightness. More recent evidence shows that
 1 It is reasonable to assume that when a decisionmaker
 states his or her price or certainty equivalent for an option,
 he or she will often cognitively perform a series of com-
 parisons between the option and candidate prices,
 although these comparisons are not indispensable.
 participants typically change their minds in
 approximately 25 percent of choice pairs
 (approximately equal in expected value but
 differing in risk) that are presented twice
 (Colin F. Camerer 1989; John D. Hey and
 Chris Orme 1994; Peter Wakker, Ido Erev,
 and Elke U. Weber 1994; T. Parker Ballinger
 and Nathaniel T. Wilcox 1997; Jerome R.
 Busemeyer, Ethan Weg, Rachel Barkan,
 Xuyang Li, and Zhengping Ma 2000).
 In an extensive study of choice consisten-
 cy, Hey (2001) asked participants to make
 one hundred choices between pairs of gam-
 bles that were repeated in five sessions.
 Participants were paid according to the out-
 come of the chosen gamble. Overall rates of
 inconsistencies varied greatly across partici-
 pants, ranging from 1 percent to 21 percent.
 On average, participants changed their
 choices 11 percent of the time from the first
 to the second session. Not a single partici-
 pant had consistent preferences across the
 first two sessions, while rates of inconsisten-
 cy decreased slightly. Participants reversed
 their choices 9 percent of the time from the
 fourth to the fifth session.2 Virtually all of the
 participants were inconsistent throughout
 the entire experiment. Only one of the fifty-
 three participants made identical choices in
 the last three sessions.
 In sum, we have crossed the first bound of
 rationality. The literature is replete with
 choice variability over time, contexts, and
 occasions. To accommodate these results
 and those of many other studies, we must
relax the assumption that choices are deter-
 ministic, and accept the inherent variability
 of preferences.
 3. Strong Stochastic Transitivity
 We now turn to probabilistic theories of
 choice (for an overview, see Anthony A. J.
 2 Note, however, that in Hey (2001) participants were
 forced to select one gamble out of the pairs instead of also
 allowing expressions of indifference. Thereby, inconsistent
 choices do not necessarily represent systematic or unsys-
 tematic inconsistencies, but could be due to indifferences
 between particular gambles.
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 Marley 1992). These theories posit the exis-
 tence of a function that maps choice pairs into
 probabilities. Hereafter, p(AI{A,B}) denotes
 the probability of choosing A from the set A
 and B. Choice probabilities are often estimat-
 ed by presenting an individual with the same
 choice on multiple occasions (with other
 problems interwoven between repetitions).
 Weak probabilistic choice theories imply that
 either A is preferred to B if, and only if,
 p(AI{A,B}) > .50, or B is preferred to A if, and
 only if, p(BI{A,B}) > .50 (indifference holds in
 the very rare case that p(AI{A,B}) = .50; for a
 review, see Luce 2000). Strong probabilistic
 choice theories make precise predictions
 about the probability mass of each option in
 the set.
 There are two classes of strong probabilis-
 tic theories-random utility theories and
 fixed utility theories (see Gordon Becker,
 Morris H. Degroot, and Jacob Marschak
 1963; Luce and Patrick Suppes 1965).
 According to random utility theories, indi-
 viduals select the option with the highest
 utility using a deterministic decision rule and
 variable utilities that differ over time and
 contexts (Louis L. Thurstone 1959; Becker,
 Degroot, and Marschak 1963; Tom
 Domencich and Daniel L. McFadden 1975;
 Charles F. Manski 1977; McFadden 1981,
 2001; Marley and Hans Colonius 1992; for a
 review, see Marley 1992). In contrast, fixed
 utility theories (also called "simple scalabili-
 ty theories") assume that individuals select
 the option with the highest utility using a
 probabilistic decision rule and deterministic
 utilities. If a theory fulfills the property of
 simple scalability, each option in a choice set
 can be assigned a scale value such that the
 choice probabilities are a monotone function
 of the scale values of the options (Tversky
 1972a). A third approach assumes that both
 the utilities and the decision process are
 deterministic, but choices are based on ran-
 domly selected strategies (see, e.g., Machina
 1985; John W. Payne, James R. Bettman, and
 Eric J. Johnson 1993; Graham Loomes and
 Robert Sugden 1995; J6rg Rieskamp and
 Philipp E. Otto 2006). However, this
 approach has not addressed the phenomena
 reviewed in this article.
 Random utility theories, representing the
 first class of strong probabilistic choice theo-
 ries, are defined as follows: Given a set of n
 options, each option, Ai, is assigned a ran-
 dom utility U(Ai), defined by a single joint
 distribution function for all choice sets.3
 Option Ai is always chosen when it has the
 highest utility of the available options, and
 its choice probability is:
 (1) p(A) = p2[U(A,) > U(Aj),
 for allj = 1, 2,)...,n,j # i.
 A simplifying assumption commonly used in
 conjunction with standard random utility
 models is that the utility of an option can be
 expressed as
 (2) U(Ai) = Ikk ' Xik+ i,
 where x are the k attributes of the options, /
 are the weights assigned to the attributes,
 and e is an error. Random utility models tend
 to differ according to the assumptions made
 about the errors. If it is assumed that the
 error component is identically and independ-
 ently distributed following an extreme value
 distribution, the multinomial logit model
 results, which is the most common random
 utility choice model (Kenneth E. Train 2003,
 for an overview see McFadden 2001).
 According to this model, the probability that
 option Ai is chosen is defined as:
 (3) xfk)
 3 More formally, assume that X is a complete set of
 options and Y is a subset of X(Y CX), that is Y= {A,,...,A,,A)
 and X= {A...An} with n 0 m. Define Ux= [U],U2....U,,]
 as a random utility vector with the probability distribution
 function F(u,....u,) = F(u) and density f(u,...,Un) =f(u).
 Then p(AIY) equals the probability of sampling a random
 utility vector Ux within the set Ai,= {lu e R" I ui, - u for
 j= 1 ...m}. This probability equals the integral of the dis-
 tribution within the region A,:
 p(AIY) = dF(u) = ff(u)du.
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 where x and 0 are defined in equation 2. The
 key assumption of the model is the independ-
 ent error component, which implies that the
 alternatives' utilities are also independent.
 Fixed utility theories, representing the
 second class of strong probabilistic choice
 theories, are probabilistic extensions of
 deterministic utility theories that share a
 property known as "simple scalability"
 (Becker, Degroot, and Marschak 1963; Luce
 and Suppes 1965; Tversky 1972a). Fixed util-
 ity theories imply that a single scale value can
 be assigned to each option in a complete set
 of options and that this value will be inde-
 pendent of the other options in the choice set
 presented. For example, u(A) and u(B) can
 be real numbers that represent the utilities of
 options A and B. The choice probability for
 an arbitrary pair of options is determined by
 means of a function, F, ranging from zero to
 one, where:
 (4) p(AI{A,B}) = F[u(A),u(B)].
 F is strictly increasing in the first argument
 and strictly decreasing in the second, and
 F[u(A), u(B)] = .50 when u(A) = u(B). All
 simplefixed utility theories imply strong sto-
 chastic transitivity, which is a natural exten-
 sion of the deterministic axiom of transitivity
 (see Edwards 1961).
 The consistency principle of strong sto-
 chastic transitivity states that for any arbitrary
 triplet of options, A, B, and C:
 If p(AI{A,B}) 0 .50 and p(BI{B,C}) > .50,
 then p(A|{A,C}) 0 max{p(AI{A,B}),
 p(Bi{B,C})}.
 The first condition, p(AI{A,B}) 0 .50,
 implies that u(A) 0 u(B). The second con-
 dition, p(BI{B,C})>.50, implies that
 u(B) 0 u(C). By the transitivity of real
 numbers, u(A) 0 u(C), the first conse-
 quence, p(Al{A,C}) 0 p(Al{A,B}1), follows
 from u(B) 0 u(C) and the assumption that
 F is a decreasing function of the second
 argument. The second consequence,
 p(AI{A,C})> p(BJ{B,C}), follows from
 u(A) 0 u(B) and the assumption that F is an
 increasing function of the first argument. The
 class of fixed utility theories includes Luce's
 (1959) choice model and many more recent
 theories. Although not all random utility the-
 ories do, Thurstone's (1927) Case V model
 and the multinominal logit model described
 above also imply strong stochastic transitivity
 (for proofs, see Luce and Suppes 1965). For a
 review, see Hey and Orme (1994) and David
 W Harless and Camerer (1994).
 Does human choice behavior obey the
 principle of strong stochastic transitivity? An
 overwhelming number of studies suggest
 otherwise. Many of the original experiments
 were carried out several decades ago (Clyde
 H. Coombs 1958; Coombs and Dean G.
 Pruitt 1961; David H. Krantz 1967; Tversky
 and Russo 1969; Lennart Sjoberg 1975,
 1977; Sjoberg and Dora Capozza 1975). In
 one study (Coombs and Pruitt 1961), partic-
 ipants were asked to choose between mone-
 tary gambles with different variances. In 25
 percent of all possible triplets, choices vio-
 lated strong stochastic transitivity. In anoth-
 er study of choices between gambles with
 cigarettes as outcomes that were given to the
 participants, Betty J. Griswold and Luce
 (1962) found strong stochastic transitivity
 violations in 26 percent of all triplets.
 Donald L. Rumelhart and James G. Greeno
 (1971) presented participants with pairs of
 celebrities and asked them to select the
 celebrity with whom they would prefer to
 have a one-hour conversation. Violations of
 strong stochastic transitivity appeared in 46
 percent of the possible triplets.
 Mellers and Karen Biagini (1994)
 reviewed the literature on strong stochastic
 transitivity violations and argued that the
 presence or absence of such violations
 depends on the comparability of options
 (Krantz 1967; Tversky and Russo 1969).
 When people compare multiattribute
 options, the similarity of values along one
 attribute enhances differences on other
 attributes. These comparability effects are
 easily linked to cognitive processing. When
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 evaluating options, people pay more atten-
 tion to attributes that differ. Consider, for
 example, two jobs with comparable salaries,
 but different commuting times. Due to the
 similarity of salaries, people place greater
 attention and importance on differences in
 commuting times.
 Comparability effects imply that viola-
 tions of strong stochastic transitivity should
 follow a specific predictable pattern. Mellers
 and Biagini (1994) reanalyzed several data
 sets and found strong experimental evi-
 dence. To illustrate the effect, consider the
 three gambles shown in table 1. Gamble A
 offers a 29 percent chance of winning $3,
 otherwise $0, gamble B has a 5 percent
 chance of winning $17.50, otherwise $0, and
 gamble C has a 9 percent chance of winning
 $9.70, otherwise $0. Gambles are matched
 in expected values. Furthermore, gambles B
 and C have relatively similar levels of proba-
 bility (i.e., 5 percent and 9 percent).
 Mellers, Chang, Birnbaum, and Ordonez
 (1992) found that A was preferred to B,
 p(A|{A,B}) = .59, and B was preferred to C,
 p(B|{B,C}) = .72. Strong stochastic transitivi-
 ty implies that the preference for A over C
 should be at least as high as .72. Instead,
 p(AI{A,C}), the preference for A over C was
 only .51. This finding was observed with and
 without financial incentives (i.e., paying par-
 ticipants the gambles' outcomes). One could
 argue that either the preference for B over
 C was "too strong" or the preference for A
 over C was "too weak." Mellers and Biagini
 argued that the similarity of probability lev-
 els for gambles B and C (5 percent and 9
 percent, respectively) increased the per-
 ceived differences in payoffs ($17.50 and
 $9.70, respectively) making B seem much
 better than C.4
 Mellers and Biagini (1994) proposed a
 contrast-weighting model to explain this pat-
 tern of strong stochastic transitivity violations.
 4 In their paper, Mellers et al. (1992) presented
 strength of preference judgments, which were converted
 to choice proportions for this review.
 Consider a choice between two gambles,
 where gamble A has some probability, pA, of
 winning xA, and gamble B has some probabili-
 ty, PB, of winning xB. The probability of select-
 ing gamble A over B is the difference between
 the products of utilities and subjective
 probabilities as follows:
 (5) p(AI{A,B}) =
 J[U(XA)aS(pA),l-U(XB)aS(pB)'],
 where ] is a response function (e.g., a
 cumulative logistic function), and a and P
 are weights associated with utilities and
 subjective probabilities, respectively. The
 weight associated with the utilities, a,
 depends on the difference between the
 subjective probabilities (i.e., S(pA) - s(pB)).
 The bigger the probability difference, the
 smaller the value of a. The same logic holds
 for P; the bigger the difference between
 the utilities, the smaller the weight
 attached to probabilities. Similar values on
 one attribute enhance differences on other
 attributes.
 The stochastic difference model (Claudia
 Gonzalez-Vallejo 2002) is another psycholog-
 ical model that can explain violations of
 strong stochastic transitivity by assuming that
 options are compared intradimensionally.
 For each dimension, the model determines
 the proportional advantage or disadvantage
 of an option compared with the other option.
 For example, if gamble A's outcome is larger
 than gamble B's outcome (i.e., XA > XB), the
 proportional advantage of gamble A is com-
 puted as (xA - XB)/XA. If the winning probabil-
 ity of gamble A is smaller than the winning
 probability of B, this represents a propor-
 tional disadvantage defined as (PB - PA)/PB.
 The disadvantage is subtracted from the
 advantage providing a proportional differ-
 ence d. The decisionmaker prefers the first
 option, when d is larger than (6+ e), where 6
 is a personal decision threshold parameter
 and E is a normal distributed error with mean
 zero and a standard deviation, o-, as a free
 parameter.
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 4. Independence from Irrelevant
 Alternatives
 Another principle implied by fixed utility
 theories, is the independence from irrelevant
 alternatives (IIA). This principle states that
 the relative preference for two options, such
 as A and B, should not vary when each is
 evaluated with respect to option C or D (see
 Roy Radner and Marschak 1954; Tversky
 and Russo 1969; Tversky 1972a).5
 More formally, this principle states that
 for any arbitrary quadruple of options, A, B,
 C, or D, the following property must hold:
 If p(AI{A,C}) 0 p(BI{B,C}),
 then p(AI{A,D}) 0 p(B|{B,D}).
 The condition on the left implies that
 u(A) 0 u(B), and that this order implies the
 consequence on the right. There is an equiv-
 alence relation between strong stochastic
 transitivity and the IIA. Tversky and Russo
 (1969) proved that one principle is satisfied
 if, and only if, the other is satisfied. Tversky
 (1972a) also proved that the IIA is sufficient
 for guaranteeing the construction of a fixed
 utility theory.
 There is a stronger version of the IIA
 principle economists often refer to:
 According to Luce (1959), this principle
 states that when having an option set T con-
 taining the options A and B the following
 property must hold:
 5 Also called "property alpha" by Sen (1993); for an
 overview of the different notions, see lain McLean (1995).
 (6) p(Aj{A,B}) = p(AIS)
 where S is any possible subset of T including
 A and B.
 This stronger version does not only
 require that the order of the choice proba-
 bilities for A and B be independent, but also
 that the ratios of the choice probabilities be
 independent of the option sets.
 Psychologists have commonly focused
 upon testing the weaker and more general
 version of the IIA principles, which of course
 implies violations of the stronger independ-
 ence principle. Violations of the weak version
 are more remarkable since they represent
 changes in the order of preferences, whereas
 violations of the strong version may be
 caused by only slight changes in the strength
 of preferences. Therefore the focus of our
 review is on the weak version. Many studies
 show that people violate the weaker form of
 the independence principle. Busemeyer and
 James T. Townsend (1993) reviewed this lit-
 erature and argued that these violations were
 driven by the same comparability effects that
 lead to violations of strong stochastic transi-
 tivity. For example, Busemeyer (1985) inves-
 tigated the independence axiom in
 sequential choices between a gamble and a
 "sure thing." Participants, who were paid
 according to the gambles' outcomes, had to
 choose between gambles: There was a low-
 risk gamble, A, (normally distributed with
 mean zero and standard deviation 5() and a
 high-risk gamble, B, (normally distributed
 TABLE 1
 GAMBLES USED BY MELLERS ET AL. (1992) TO ILLUSTRATE COMPARABILITY EFFECTS
 A B C
 Probability of Winning .29 .05 .09
 Amounts to Win $3.00 $17.50 $9.70
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 with mean zero and standard deviation 500).
 There were also two sure things: C was-10
 and D was 10. Participants preferred A to C,
 and B to C. Furthermore, p(AI{A,C}) was
 greater than p(BI{B,C}) (i.e., p(AI{A,C}) = .75,
 and p(Bi{B,C}) = .56). According to the inde-
 pendence principle, p(AI{A,D}) should be
 greater than p(BI{B,D}). However, the oppo-
 site order appeared (i.e., p(AI{A,D}) =.30,
 and p(BI{B,D}) = .50).
 Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) argued
 that choice probability between two gam-
 bles, A and B, is an increasing function of the
 ratio d = (u(A) - u(B))/o-, where the numer-
 ator is the expectation of the differences
 between the random utilities of the gambles,
 and the denominator is the standard devia-
 tion of the differences between the random
 utilities of the gambles. The standard devia-
 tion, oa, determines how easy or difficult it is
 to discriminate the mean difference. Choices
 between the low-risk gamble and the sure
 thing are easy to discriminate because the
 standard deviation, o0, is small; whereas
 choices between the high-risk gamble and
 the sure thing are difficult to discriminate
 because the standard deviation, oa, is large.
 Violations of the independence principle
 have also been found when choice sets con-
 tain more than two options. A famous exam-
 ple originally described by Gerard Debreu
 (1960) illustrates this case. Envisage a music
 lover who makes choices between classic
 recordings. When presented with a choice
 between a recording of Beethoven's Eighth
 Symphony (option B) and a recording of the
 Debussy quartet (option D), the music enthu-
 siast has a higher probability of choosing B.
 Then a different recording of Beethoven's
 Eighth Symphony by the same orchestra, but
 with a different conductor is added to the
 choice set (option B'). When evaluating all
 three options, the music enthusiast has the
 highest probability of choosing the recording
 of the Debussy quartet. The probability of
 choosing a recording of the Eighth Symphony
 is now divided between the two recordings of
 the Eighth Symphony, and thus is smaller.
 This preference pattern violates fixed utility
 theories for the following reason: The initial
 binary choice between Beethoven and
 Debussy implies that F[u(B), u(D)] > .50 and,
 thus, u(B) >u(D). The advantage of
 Beethoven over Debussy should continue in
 the presence of a second Beethoven record-
 ing. That is, with three options,
 p(BI{B,D,B'}) = F[u(B),u(D),u(B')] > F[u(D),
 u(B),u(B')] =p(DI{B,D,B'}) because F is an
 increasing function of the first argument and
 a decreasing function of the remaining
 arguments. But that is not what happens.
 Tversky (1972b) called this violation of the
 independence principle the similarity effect.
 Debreu's example has been frequently
 referred to and adapted to many applications
 in economics. For instance, the "red-bus
 blue-bus problem" represents a famous
 adaptation to research on transportation and
 travel behavior (e.g., Train 2003). Here a
 traveler has the choice between a car and a
 blue bus for traveling to work. Now a second
 bus, which only differs from the blue bus in
 its red color, is added to the option set.
 When now choosing among the three
 options, decisionmakers might split their
 preferences for buses between the red bus
 and the blue bus, violating the IIA principle.
 The most common random utility theory,
 the multinomial logit model described
 above, can not account for these violations
 because it assumes that the errors are statis-
 tically independent. The joint distribution of
 utilities for the set of options Y is assumed to
 b  identically and statistically independent
 for all choice sets. Since these independence
violations seem intuitively reasonable, the
 insufficiency of the multinomial logit model
 o explain them has initiated an extensive
 development of new versions of random util-
 ity theories. These new versions of random
 utility theories, predominantly proposed by
 economists, allow correlations in the joint
 distributions of utilities (for an overview, see
 Robert J. Meyer and Barbara E. Kahn 1991;
 McFadden 2001). These theories have been
 successfully applied to describe choices in a
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 variety of domains, including transportation
 alternatives (David A. Hensher 1986;
 McFadden 1974), occupations (Peter
 Schmidt and Robert P. Strauss 1975), or
 automobiles (Steven T. Berry 1994; Berry,
 James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes 1999).
 Three important classes of random utility
 models can be distinguished: generalized
 extreme value models, multinomial probit or
 Thurstone models, and mixed logit models
 (for an overview, see William H. Greene
 2000 or Train 2003).
 The most prominent model of the general-
 ized extreme value models (McFadden 1978)
 is the nested logit model, which assumes that
 the choice set can be partitioned into subsets,
 called nests. The error components in equa-
 tion 2 may be correlated within each subset
 but are uncorrelated across nests. With this
 assumption, the IIA principle holds for all
 options within a nest but not for options across
 nests. These models can explain particular
 violations of IIA.
 The second class of random utility models,
 multinomial Thurstone or probit models,
 including Richard D. Bock's and Lyle V.
 Jones's (1968) Thurstone model, and Jerry A.
 Hausman's and David Wise's (1978) condi-
 tional probit model, can also explain viola-
 tions of the IIA. For these models, the error
 components in equation 2 are assumed to be
 drawn from correlated normal distributions.
 Dependencies between these distributions
 capture correlations between the options.
 These models are less restrictive than the
 nested logit models and allow the prediction
 of "any pattern of substitutions among
 options" (Meyer and Kahn 1991, p. 98).
 The third and most recent class of random
 utility models is the mixed logit models, also
 called random coefficient models (Berry
 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995,
 1999; Hensher and Greene 2003; David
 Revelt and Train 1998). Mixed logit models
 assume that the weights, /, of the explanato-
 ry variables k are random parameters that
 vary across individuals q. According to these
 models, the utility of an option is:
 (7) Uq(Ai)= Lk + Eiq5
 where xikq are explanatory variables, Pkq are
 the weights for each variable that is
 assumed to be a random variable following a
 particular form, such as a normal distribu-
 tion with a particular correlation matrix, 1,
 and eiq are error components independently
 and identically extreme value distributed.
 On the one hand, the weights are allowed to
 vary across individuals to capture the het-
 erogeneity of individuals' preferences; on
 the other hand, the weights are assumed to
 be stable within an individual to permit cor-
 relations between utilities. These correla-
 tions can capture similarity effects, and
 thereby violations of IIA.
 To illustrate how the mixed logit model can
 predict similarity effects, consider the follow-
 ing problem. Suppose two different types of
 cars share the same share of the automobile
 market. The first car, A, is rather expensive,
 but very luxurious, whereas the second car,
 B, is cheap, but offers only the standard
 equipment. Mixed logit models can explain
 the equal share by assuming that the weights
 given to price and comfort vary across con-
 sumers. Half of the consumers might give a
 relatively high weight to the price, whereas
 the other half gives a relative low weight to
 the price, so that different utilities for the two
 cars, but similar market shares, result. Now
 suppose a new car, C, enters the market. It is
 cheap and similar to car B. Consumers who
 place a relatively high weight on price will
 find this car appealing, whereas the other
 consumers who preferred car A will not be
 attracted to the new car. Therefore, the mar-
 ket share of the cheap car B will decrease due
 to the market entry of the second cheap car
 C, whereas the market share of the expensive
 car A stays stable, which represents a IIA vio-
 lation. Thus, heterogeneity across individuals
 can produce correlations among the cars
 utilities. Moreover, the distributions from
 which the weights are drawn can be correlat-
 ed, so a variety of similarity effects can be
 represented.
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 To explain specific similarity effects, it can
 be helpful to represent the mixed logit
 model in another form that is mathematical-
 ly equivalent to equation 7, but decomposes
 the random weights fiqk as follows:
 (8) Uq(Ai) = kk Xikq+ +Xkkq" Z'ikq +,iq'
 where ak are fixed weights, ykq are random
 weights with a mean of zero, and Xikq and Zikq
 are explanatory variables. Since the variables
 Zikq are multiplied by weights with a mean of
 zero, the sum of the explanatory variables
 with the random weights, Ykq, and the error
 components, Eiq, represent the error compo-
 nent of the utility of option i. Notice that,
 unlike the error components, e,, the ran-
 dom weights, y'kq, can vary across individuals
 but not across options. Depending on the
 values of Zikq, options' utilities can be corre-
 lated. For instance, if an explanatory vari-
 able, Zikq, is a dummy variable that reflects
 membership in a nest, the mixed logit model
 can approximate the predictions of nested
 logit models. McFadden and Train (2000)
 have shown that, under quite general
 assumptions, any random utility model can
 be approximated by a mixed logit model.
 The mixed logit models and the other
 newer versions of the random utility models
 are relatively complex when compared to
 the multinomial logit model, so that compu-
 tational problems limited their popularity.
 But now, since it is easier to do parameter
 estimations, these models are making a
 comeback. However, the lack of parsimony
 makes it difficult to interpret the parame-
 ters, and the models are rather ad hoc (e.g.,
 membership in different nests for the nested
 logit models), and therefore, do not shed
 much light on why the similarity effects
 occur. If subsets of options for different
 choices can not be defined a priori, one
 should not generalize the predictions of the
 model to new choices. Likewise, when fit-
 ting a mixed logit model to data, one can
 describe different types of similarity effects,
 but it is often difficult to predict the effects
 a priori. Thus, these models are less suitable
 for making predictions about choices if new
 options are added to the option set (see
 Meyer and Kahn 1991). In general, the
 recent random utility theories have been
 criticized as being "black box" models that
 do not specify the psychological process of
 choice (Eliahu Stern and Harry W.
 Richardson 2005).
 Psychologists have addressed similarity
 effects, such as the violations of the IIA, by
 developing descriptive theories. Tversky
 (1972b) proposed a probabilistic choice
 theory called elimination by aspects (EBA).
 The theory makes the crucial assumption of
 attention switching, which means that
 the decisionmakers' attention randomly
 switches between the attributes of the
 available options (i.e., their aspects). For
 instance, in the "red-bus blue-bus-prob-
 lem" the decisionmaker might consider
 convenience and environment friendliness
 as two relevant attributes, with the car as
 having the aspect of being convenient and
 the busses as having the aspect of being
 environment friendly. When the decision-
 maker's attention first focuses on the con-
 venience, the two buses are eliminated
 from further consideration and the car is
 chosen. When, however, first giving consid-
 eration to the environment friendliness
 leads to the car being eliminated, after-
 wards one of the two buses is chosen. In
 this process the blue bus splits its share
 with the red bus, so that the chances of
 selecting one of the two buses are smaller
 than the chance of choosing the car.
 More generally, let T be a three-alterna-
 tive set, T = {A,B,C}. Each option has aspects
 associated with it, some shared and some
 unique. Figure 2 illustrates a special case.
 Let K be the sum of the utilities of all of the
 aspects, unique aspects u(a), u(b) and u(c),
 and shared aspects u(ab), u(ac) and u(bc).
 The probability of selecting A from the set,
 T, is:
 (9) p(AIT) = [u(a) +u(ab) . p(AI{A,B}) +
 u(ac) . p(AI{A,C})]/K.
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 Figure 2. An Alternative Set Where Alternatives Share Aspects
 Equation 9 shows the three ways that A
 could be chosen. First, a could be selected
 from the set of aspects with probability
 u(a)/K. If so, A would be chosen with prob-
 ability 1. Second, ab could be selected with
 probability u(ab)/K, and then A would be
 chosen over B with probability
 p(AI{A,B}) = (u(a) +u(ac))/(u(a) +u(ac) +
 u(b) + u(bc)).
 Finally, ac could be selected with probabili-
 ty u(ac)/K, and A would be chosen over C
 with probability
 p(A I{A,C}) = (u(a) +u(ab))/(u(a) +u(ab) +
 u(c) + u(bc)).
 The attention switching assumption of the
 elimination by aspects theory resembles the
 mechanism the mixed logit model is using to
 explain IIA violations since both theories
 assume that the weights of attributes are not
 fixed. The distinction is that the elimination
 by aspect theory assumes that weights vary
 due to attention fluctuations of each individ-
 ual, whereas the mixed logit model assumes
 that the weights are fixed for each individual
 but vary across individuals.
 The compromise effect (Itamar Simonson
 1989; Tversky and Simonson 1993) is another,
 more recently observed violation of inde-
 pendence with multiple alternatives. Let T be
 a three-option set, T = {B,C,D} each of which
 is described by two attributes. Option B has
 the most advantageous attribute value for one
 attribute, whereas option D has the most
 advantageous attribute value for the other
 attribute. Option C has attribute values that
 lie between the attribute values of option B
 and D along both attributes. When presented
 with only two options, B and C, option B is
 more popular so that p(BI{B,C}) 0
 p(C|{B,C}); however when presented with all
 three options, the relation between B and C
 reverses so that p(CI{B,C,D}) > p(BI{B,C,D}),
 thus violating IIA.
 Simonson demonstrated the effect in a
 study in which participants made choices
 among cameras. One camera was high in qual-
 ity and price, and the other was low in quality
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 and price. The third option, called the com-
 promise, had moderate values on both
 dimensions. When individuals were present-
 ed with binary choices, participants were
 roughly indifferent between the two options.
 However, when given a choice among all
 three cameras, individuals chose the com-
 promise camera more often than either of
 the two extremes. This finding violates the
 independence principle.
 To explain the compromise effect,
 Tversky and Simonson (1993) developed
 the componential context theory, which
 requires a dimensional representation of the
 options in a multidimensional space. In this
 theory, Tversky and Simonson distinguished
 between the background context defined by
 prior choice sets and the local context
 defined by the immediate choice set. If the
 background context is held constant, then
 an option, A, is selected from a set, T, if it
 maximizes:
 (10) V(AIT) =
 IkPkvk(A) + 01BTR(AB)
 where the overall value of choosing A from
 set, T, depends on the global context and the
 immediate context. The first term on the
 right side of the equation reflects the global
 context and is the sum of the products of
 each value vk associated with A along each
 dimension k times the relative contributions
 of that dimension. The second term that
 reflects the immediate context is 6, the rela-
 tive contribution of the immediate context
 times the sum of the advantages and disad-
 vantages of A relative to other options in the
 choice set. The relative advantage of A over
 B on dimension k is defined as:
 (11) R(A,B) =
 Xkadvk(A,B)
 for which advk(A,B) = vk(A) - Vk(B) if vk(A) -
 vk(B) is positive or otherwise zero. If option
 A has a disadvantage over B on dimension k
 so that vk(A) -vk(B) is negative, then
 disk(A,B) = 8[vk(B) -vk(A)], or otherwise
 zero. The theory makes the crucial assump-
 tion that 3 is a convex function incorporating
 loss aversion. Due to the loss aversion
 assumption, the disadvantage of A over B is
 larger than the corresponding advantage of
 B over A. In the compromise example, the
 compromise alternative C has small advan-
 tages and disadvantages relative to B and D,
 whereas both B and D have relatively large
 advantages and disadvantages with respect
 to each other. Due to the convex loss aver-
 sion function, the large disadvantages of B
 and D make them less appealing, whereas
 due to C's small disadvantages, it becomes
 the most attractive alternative.
 Interestingly, the elimination by aspects
 theory (Tversky 1972b) fails to predict com-
 promise effects (see Appendix A for a proof),
 and the componential context theory fails to
 explain similarity effects (see Appendix B for
 a proof). Neither theory provides a general
 and coherent account of independence vio-
 lations. Nevertheless, the theories demon-
 strate that fixed utility theories in which
 options are evaluated independently of other
 options are not suitable for explaining the
 competitive effects of options we reviewed.
 Eldar B. Shafir, Daniel N. Osherson, and
 Edward E. Smith (1993) have argued that, to
 explain these competitive effects, a compara-
 tive approach of decision theories is
 required. Theories following this compara-
 tive approach, like the elimination by aspects
 theory or the componential context theory,
 incorporate comparison processes among
 options in the evaluation process. Shafir,
 Osherson, and Smith (1993) proposed an
 advantage model, which also takes into
 account comparisons among options.
 However, since the theory is restricted to
 pairwise choices and is defined as a deter-
 ministic theory, it cannot handle the compet-
 itive effects of option sets with more than two
 options or the probabilistic nature of choice.
 In sum, two more bounds of rationality
 have now been crossed. There are numerous
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 studies and robust examples of how and
 when people violate strong stochastic transi-
 tivity and the closely related principle of IIA.
 These consistency principles must be relaxed
 to account for human choice behavior.
 5. Regularity
 Random utility theories obey a property of
 choice known as regularity. This principle
 asserts that the addition of an option to a
 choice set should never increase the proba-
 bility of selecting an option from the original
 set. More formally, assume that X is a com-
 plete set of options and Y is a subset of
 X(YCX), that is Y= {A,...A,,} and
 X = {A,...,A,} with n 0 m. If Y is presented
 for choice, and A, is a member of both Y and
 X, then the probability of choosing Ai from
 the set Y is always equal to or greater than
 the probability of selecting A, from the set X,
 that is, p(Ai IY) - p(A IX). This property holds
 for random utility theories since it is less like-
 ly that Ai has the highest utility in a larger set,
 X, with n options than in a smaller set, Y, with
 m options:
 p(AiIY) = p(U(Ai) = max{U(Al),...,U(Am)})
 > p(U(Ai) = max{U(A1),...,U(A,,)}) x
 p(U(Ai) = max{U(A),...,U(A)}U(Ai) =
 max{ U(A1),..., U(Am,,) = p(A,IX).
 That random utility theories obey the regu-
 larity principle also holds for newer versions
 of random utility theories, including the
 mixed logit model (see Appendix C for a
 proof).
 Do people obey the principle of regulari-
 ty? Many studies show robust violations of
 this principle. The addition of a new option
 can increase the choice probability for an
 option in the original set. Such violations are
 called either asymmetrical dominance
 effects (Joel Huber, Payne, and Christopher
 Puto 1982) or attraction effects (Huber and
 Puto 1983; for an overview, see Timothy B.
 Heath and Subimal Chatterjee 1995). The
 difference between these two effects refers
 to the attribute levels of the new option that
 is added to the set.
 Suppose people are indifferent between
 two options, A and B. The "decoy" option, D,
 is then added to the choice set. D is said to
 be "asymmetrically dominated" if it has val-
 ues that are worse than those of another
 option, such as B, along one attribute and its
 values are no better than those of B on all
 other attributes. Asymmetric dominance
 effects occur if the probability of choosing B
 increases when D is added to the choice set.
 Attraction effects are similar to asymmetric
 dominance effects, but D is not asymmetri-
 cally dominated by B. Instead, D simply
 seems a lot worse.
 These effects are illustrated with the
 options in table 2. Suppose a decisionmaker
 is indifferent between two laptop computers,
 A and B. A is relatively heavy, but has a large
 display. B is lighter, with a smaller display.
 Now the decisionmaker considers a third
 computer, D that is heavier than B, but has
 the same sized display. The mere presence of
 D makes B seem better. The probability of
 selecting B from the set of three computers
 (A, B, and D) is greater than the probability
 of selecting B from the set of two computers
 (A and B). This increase in probability is the
 asymmetric dominance effect. Now suppose
 that the decoy, D, is not asymmetrically
 dominated by B, yet it still seems inferior to
 B (e.g., the display for D is 13.2 inches,
 rather than 13 inches). Here, the increase in
 the probability of B with the inclusion of D is
 called the attraction effect. In both cases, the
 result is a violation of regularity.
 Asymmetrical dominance effects have
 been found in choices among gambles
 (Douglas H. Wedell 1991), consumer prod-
 ucts and services (Wedell and Jonathan C.
 Pettibone 1996), job applicants (Scott
 Highhouse 1996), and political candidates in
 U.S. elections (Yigang Pan, Sue O'Curry, and
 Robert Pitts 1995). The effects occur with
 choices and other measures of preference
 (Dan Ariely and Thomas S. Wallsten 1995;
 Sanjay Mishra, U.N. Umesh, and Donald E.
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 TABLE 2
 ILLUSTRATION OF ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE EFFECTS WITH CHOICES AMONG LAPTOPS
 A B D
 Weight 6 lbs 3 lbs 3.5 lbs
 Display Size 15 ins 13 ins 13 ins
 Stem 1993; Pan and Donald R. Lehmann
 1993; Tversky and Simonson 1993). Finally,
 the effects are highly robust in both within-
 subject designs (repeated choices by the
 same individuals) and between-subject
 designs (different choices across groups of
 individuals).
 Random utility theories cannot account
 for violations of regularity because the joint
 distribution of utilities for the option set, Y,
 is assumed to remain the same when options
 are added to create a larger set, X. However,
 the empirical evidence suggests that the
 joint distribution of utilities for the larger set
 changes depending on the options that are
 included in the set. A psychological theory
 that specifies the cognitive process of choice
 and can explain dependencies among
 options has been proposed by Busemeyer
 and Townsend (1993) and Robert M. Roe,
 Busemeyer, and Townsend (2001). It is
 called decision field theory. According to this
 theory, choices are the result of a dynamic
 process during which the decisionmaker
 retrieves, compares, and integrates random
 utilities over time. During the deliberation
 period, a random utility is retrieved for each
 option, Ai, at each moment in time t, denot-
 ed Ut(Ai). These utilities are integrated
 across time by a linear dynamic process to
 form a preference state:
 (14) Pt(A) = s. Pt_(A) + Ut(Ai) -
 _IJ(Aj),#j
 where s is a weight that reflects the memory
 of recent preferences. The coefficients,
 ci= cji, are a function of the distances
 between the options in a multidimensional
 attribute space.
 The theory postulates that the decision-
 maker forms preference states for options
 that are the result of previous preference
 states plus the currently retrieved utilities
 for options minus negative influences of
 alternative options in the choice set. If a
 preference state for an option crosses a
 threshold, the decisionmaker selects that
 option. During the dynamic process of com-
 paring the alternatives, attention switches
 from one attribute to another; thus, the the-
 ory also includes an attention switching
 assumption as was proposed by the elimina-
 tion by aspect theory (Tversky 1972b), which
 allows the explanation of similarity effects.
 In addition, the theory assumes that options
 compete with each other (in the case where
 ci > 0) and similar options compete more
 heavily than dissimilar options by exerting
 stronger negative influences. These compet-
 itive effects can predict violations of regular-
 ity (see Roe, Busemeyer, and Townsend
 2001; Busemeyer and Adele Diederich
 2002). The theory also predicts that these
 violations of regularity should increase when
 decisionmakers deliberate longer, a predic-
 tion that has been supported in several
 experiments (Simonson 1989; Wedell 1991;
 Ravi Dhar, Stephen M. Nowlis, and Steven
 J. Sherman 2000).
 Another psychological theory that can
 explain dependencies between options is a
 nonlinear adaptive network model called the
 leaky, competing accumulator model (Marius
 Usher and James L. McClelland 2004). This
 theory is very similar to decision field theory
 in the sense that it also assumes that prefer-
 ences develop in a dynamic manner over
 time. Likewise, it includes the attention
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 switching assumption to explain similarity
 effects. In contrast to decision field theory, it
 assumes loss aversion to explain regularity
 violations. Thus, it combines the attention
 switching assumption of the elimination by
 aspect theory (Tversky 1972b) with the loss
 aversion assumption of the componential
 context theory (Tversky and Simonson 1993)
 to explain IIA and regularity violations.
 6. Weak Stochastic Transitivity
 Weak stochastic transitivity is perhaps the
 weakest bound on rationality of the five prin-
 ciples that we consider. This principle states
 that for any arbitrary triple of options, A, B,
 and C:
 If p(AI{A,B}) > .50 and p(BI{B,C}) 0 .50,
 then p(AI{A,C}) 0 .50.
 Weak stochastic transitivity lies at the heart
 of weak probabilistic choice theories.
 Those theories based on standard utility
 assumptions must satisfy the principle
 because u(A) 0 u(B) 0 u(C) -4 p(A|{A,C})
 > .50. Furthermore, many strong probabilis-
 tic choice theories must also satisfy weak
 stochastic transitivity, including all simple
 scalable or fixed utility theories, elimination
 by aspects theory, and decision field theory.
 The contrast-weighting model and the sto-
 chastic-difference model can, however,
 account for violations of weak stochastic
 transitivity. Among the random utility mod-
 els considered here, only the mixed logit
 model allows violations of weak stochastic
 transitivity (for an example, see Appendix
 D). In contrast, the other random utility
 models, like, for instance, the generalized
 extreme value model, obey the principle of
 weak stochastic transitivity (see Appendix E
 for a proof).
 It is interesting to look closely at a classic
 study by Tversky (1969) to understand the
 conditions under which violations of weak
 stochastic transitivity can occur. Tversky
 asked participants to choose between pairs of
 gambles, as shown in table 3. Gambles varied
 in probabilities and payoffs, but expected
 values were similar. When presented with
 gambles having similar probabilities, some
 participants frequently preferred the gamble
 with the larger payoff. That is, they preferred
 A to B, B to C, C to D, and D to E. But when
 presented with gambles that substantially
 differed in probabilities, they preferred the
 gamble with the greater probability of win-
 ning. That is, they preferred E to A. Tversky's
 results were later replicated by Harold R.
 Lindman and James Lyons (1978) and
 extended by Jonathan W Leland (1994).
 Tversky (1969) proposed an additive dif
 ference model based on the concept of a just
 noticeable difference (Luce 1956, p. 180) to
 account for the violations. A just noticeable
 difference is the amount of change required
 in a physical stimulus before people detect a
 difference between similar stimuli on some
 percentage of occasions. Tversky argued that
 differences in probabilities for the adjacent
 gambles (i.e., A and B, or B and C) were less
 than a just noticeable difference, or not suffi-
 ciently great for people to differentiate
 between gambles. The additive difference
 model is a noncompensatory, lexicographic
 semi-order A model is noncompensatory if
 the information from one dimension cannot
 be compensated by any combination of infor-
 mation from other less important dimensions
 TABLE 3
 GAMBLES USED BY TVERSKY (1969) To DEMONSTRATE INTRANSITIVE PREFERENCES
 A B C D E
 Probability of Winning 7/24 8/24 9/24 10/24 11/24
 Payoff $5.00 $4.75 $4.50 $4.25 $4.00
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 (see also Rieskamp and Ulrich Hoffrage
 1999). In this account, decisionmakers select
 the gamble with the highest value on the
 most important dimension, but if the differ-
 ence between gambles on that dimension is
 too small to be detected, decisionmakers
 consider the next most important dimension
 and choose the gamble with the highest value
 on that dimension, and so on.
 Ariel Rubinstein (1988) and Leland (1994)
 offer a similar account to describe choices
 between gambles. They argue that people
 follow a sequential decision process in which
 they first check whether one gamble domi-
 nates the other. Then they compare the
 probabilities across gambles and outcomes
 across gambles. If levels of either attribute
 are perceived as being similar on one dimen-
 sion and dissimilar on the other dimension,
 the dissimilar dimension becomes decisive.
 Only after these steps are completed do
 decisionmakers move to an unspecified third
 step of selecting a gamble. This account, also
 based on perceived similarity, predicts the
 intransitive choices described above. The
 contrast-weighting model offered by Mellers
 and Biagini (1994) is a more precise version
 of this idea in which the effects of similarity
 and dissimilarity are reflected in the weights
 associated with the contrasts.
 The idea of a noncompensatory decision
 process that focuses on one dimension at a
 time combined with a just noticeable differ-
 ence is a reasonable explanation for such vio-
 lations, especially when options differ along
 many dimensions and the differences vary
 substantially. It is efficient to place greater
 attention on dimensions with larger differ-
 ences and ignore or discount dimensions with
 smaller differences (Mellers and Biagini
 1994). Furthermore, theories that permit vio-
 lations of weak stochastic transitivity (Tversky
 1969; Mellers and Biagini 1994; Gonzalez-
 Vallejo 2002) assume that decisionmakers
 compare options intradimensional-wise, that
 is, focusing on each dimension sequentially.
 Intradimensional comparisons are usually
 easier than interdimensional comparisons,
 especially when dimensions differ in meas-
 urement units (Tversky 1969). Finally,
 intradimensional comparisons simplify the
 detection of dominance relationships.
 Another class of theories that allow intran-
 sitive choices is regret theories (David E. Bell
 1982; Peter C. Fishburn 1982; Loomes and
 Sugden 1982). These theories assume that
 the decisionmaker prefers the option with
 the highest utility but the utility of an option
 depends on an independent evaluation of the
 option and a comparative evaluation with the
 ot er option as follows:
 (15) u(Ai) = Ep, [u(x) +
 w .- R(u(xs),U(Xsj)),
 where Ai is the option under consideration,
 Aj is the alternative option, s refers to states
 with consequences x, and where w = 1 if
 u(xsi) > u(xsj), and w -=-1 otherwise. The
n nlinear function R(u(xsi), u(xj)) is increas-
 ing in its first argument and decreasing in its
 second argument; a possible function could
 be R[u(xs), u(xsj)] = [u(xs) --U(Xsj)].
 To illustrate, consider three pairwise
 choices between the gambles A, B, and C,
 with outcomes determined by throwing a
 die. Gamble A has the smallest payoff of $2
 with certainty, gamble B has a medium pay-
 off of $3 if the die throw results in a one,
 two, three, or four, and option C has the
 highest payoff of $5 if the die throw results
 in a five or six. In a choice between A and B,
 A has the higher utility because the antici-
 pated regret associated with B if the die
 comes up five or six is disproportionately
 large relative to the regret associated with A
 if a one, two, three, or four were thrown.
 Furthermore, the decisionmaker will prefer
 B to C using the same logic. However, in a
 choice between A and C, the decisionmaker
 will prefer C, because the anticipated regret
 with A if a one or two is thrown is extremely
 high. As this examples shows, regret theories
 can explain intransitive choices, but they
 cannot explain compromise or attraction
 effects, nor can they handle the probabilistic
 nature of choice.
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 How common are violations of weak sto-
 chastic transitivity? John M. Davis (1958)
 found some violations but decided they were
 nonsystematic. Donald Davidson and
 Marschak (1959) studied preferences for
 bets and found that 7 percent to 14 percent
 of choice triples violated transitivity.
 Kenneth R. MacCrimmon (1968) examined
 the choices of thirty-eight business man-
 agers and found that eight exhibited some
 intransitivities, although the violations did
 not appear to be reliable. William T.
 Harbaugh, Kate Krause, and Timothy R.
 Berry (2001) examined transitivity in chil-
 dren and found relatively few violations,
 although many inconsistencies. The intransi-
 tivities found by Tversky (1969) were based
 on a preselected group of participants for
 whom inconsistent behavior had been
 observed before. In a recent summary of the
 literature, Luce (2000) pointed out that
 intransitivities may occur, but it may be due
 to the simple fact that choices are not always
 consistent (see also Jean Claude Falmagne
 and Geoffrey Iverson 1979).
 Other researchers have found systematic
 violations of weak stochastic transitivity
 (Henry Montgomery 1977; Robert H.
 Ranyard 1977; David V. Budescu and Wendy
 Weiss 1987; Birnbaum, Jamie N. Patton, and
 Melissa K. Lott 1999; Lindman and Lyons
 1978; Peter Roelofsma and Daniel Read
 2000). However, these violations-in stark
 contrast to violations of strong stochastic
 transitivity-are relatively rare. That is,
 there are reliable circumstances where they
 occur, but those circumstances are fairly
 unusual (see Becker, Degroot, and
 Marschak 1963; Krantz 1967; Rumelhart
 and Greeno 1971; Sjoberg 1975, 1977;
 Sjoberg and Capozza 1975; Mellers, Chang,
 Birnbaum, and Ordonez 1992). For these
 reasons, it can be argued that the principle
 of weak stochastic transitivity should gener-
 ally be retained as a bound of rationality.
 Descriptive theories that do not allow viola-
 tions of weak stochastic transitivity usually
 perform reasonably well when predicting
 choice behavior in many, perhaps even most,
 situations.
 7. Discussion
 The goal of the present review is to exam-
 ine how, when, and why people violate con-
 sistency principles that embody the
 traditional view of rationality. Five con-
 straints on preferential choice were
 addressed. Those constraints, or consistency
 principles, are partially ordered on a contin-
 uum from strictest to weakest. Figure 1
 shows that the principles include perfect
 consistency, strong stochastic transitivity,
 IIA, regularity, and, finally, weak stochastic
 transitivity. The evidence for and against
 each principle was examined. The empirical
 effects, their connections to principles, and
brief definitions of the effects are presented
 in able 4. The frequency and breadth of the
 violations declined as we proceeded from
 stricter to weaker bounds. There was strong
 evidence against perfect consistency, strong
 stochastic transitivity, independence, and
 regularity. This evidence is important
 because it implies that descriptive theories
 must relax these constraints in order to make
accurate predictions.
 7.1 Comparison of Models
 Deterministic theories of choice, such as
 the subjective expected utility theory
 (Leonard J. Savage 1954) or multiattribute
 utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa 1976), can-
 not accommodate the fact that choices are
 probabilistic. The "conventional strategy"
 (Starmer 2000) for handling this problem is
 to claim that inconsistencies are random.
 Though tempting, this strategy fails to
 explain how and when choice probabilities
 will vary across sets. To accomplish the lat-
 ter, two classes of probabilistic choice theo-
 ries were proposed: fixed utility theories
 (e.g., Debreu 1958; Luce 1958) and random
 utility theories (e.g., Thurstone 1959;
 Becker, Degroot, and Marschak 1963;
 McFadden 2000).
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 TABLE 4
 SUMMARY OF EFFECTS
 Principles Emperical Evidence Brief Description of Effects
 Strong Stochastic Comparability Effects p(AI{A,B)) > .5, p(BI{B,C}) > .5, and p(AI{A,C}) > .5,
 Transitivity but p(BI{B,C}) > p(Aj{A,C}) when B and C have similar values on one dimension
 Independence Similarity Effects p(BII{Bj,D}) > p(D {B1,D}),
 from Irrelevant but p(BI|{Bj,D,B2}) <p(DI{BI,D,B21)
 Alternatives
 Compromise Effects p(BI{B,C}) > p(CI{B,C}) but p(CI{A,B,C}) > p(B|{A,B,C}) when values of C
 are between values of A and B on all dimensions
 Regularity Asymmetric Dominance p(AI{A,B,DI) > p(A {A,B}) when D is dominated by A, but not by B
 Effects
 Attraction Effects p(AI{A,B,D)) > p(AI{A,B}) when D is much inferior to A, but not to B
 Weak Stochastic Transitivity Violations p(AI{A,B}) > .5, p(Bj{B,C}) > .5, but p(CI(A,C)) > .5
 Transitivity
 Fixed utility theories that assume a well-
 defined preference function imply strong
 stochastic transitivity and the IIA. Again,
 there is a considerable body of empirical evi-
 dence, including similarity effects, compara-
 bility effects, and the compromise effect,
 showing violations of these principles.
 Random utility theories imply a consistency
 principle of regularity. There is a substantial
 body of evidence, including attraction
 effects and asymmetric dominance effects,
 against regularity.
 A number of psychological theories have
 been proposed to accommodate the viola-
 tions. Table 5 summarizes many of the theo-
 ries previously mentioned and shows which
 effects they can and cannot predict. Tversky's
 (1972b) elimination by aspects theory pro-
 vides an elegant account of similarity effects
 (violation of independence) but fails to
 account for asymmetric dominance effects
 and attraction effects (violations of regularity).
 Tversky and Simonson (1993) developed the
 componential context theory to account for
 compromise effects but their theory cannot
 describe similarity effects. Violations of strong
 and weak stochastic transitivity can be
 explained by the contrast-weighting model
 (Mellers and Biagini 1994) and the stochastic
 difference model (Gonzalez-Vallejo 2002).
 But since these models have only been
 defined for binary choices, they cannot predict
 asymmetric dominance effects, attraction
 effects, compromise effects, or similarity
 effects. The most general theories considered,
 decision field theory (Busemeyer and
 Townsend 1993; Roe, Busemeyer, and
 Townsend 2001) and the leaky, competing
 accumulator model (Usher and McClelland
 2004), can explain most effects, except
 violations of weak stochastic transitivity.
 In sum, we have reviewed several theories
 that can predict, to differing degrees, viola-
 tions of the consistency principles. We now
 face the more general question of how to
 select a descriptive theory of preferential
 choice. Most theorists agree that two criteria
 are essential for model selection: pre-
 dictability and parsimony (see Heinz Linhart
 and Walter Zucchini 1986; Pitt, Myung, and
 Zhang 2002). The best theory is one that
 accurately predicts human behavior and is
 simple. Unfortunately, when fitting a model
 to the data, accuracy and parsimony usually
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 TABLE 5
 SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES, VIOLATIONS, AND THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS
 Principles Violations Theoretical Accounts
 Consistency Variations in MNL GEV MLM DFT LCA CWM SDM EBA
 Choices
 Strong Comparability GEV MLM DFT LCA CWM SDM EBA ADM
 Stochastic Effects
 Transitivity
 Independence Similarity Effects GEV MLM DFT LCA EBA
 from Irrelevant
 Alternatives Compromise GEV MLM DFT LCA CCT
 Effects
 Regularity Asymmetric DFT LCA CCT
 Dominance
 Effects
 Attraction Effects DFT LCA CCT
 Weak Transitivity MLM CWM SDM ADM
 Stochastic Violations
 Transitivity
 where MNL= Multinomial Logit Model, GEV = Generalized Extreme Value Model, MLM = Mixed Logit Model, DFT =
 Decision Field Theory, LCA = Leaky, Competing Accumulator Model, CWM = Contrast-Weighting Model, SDM = Stochastic
 Difference Model, EBA = Elimination by Aspects, CCT = Componential Context Theory, and ADM = Additive Difference
 Model
 work in opposition; the more complex the
 model, the better the fit.
 For choice contexts with equally similar or
 equally discriminable options, violations of
 IIA are less common and simple scalable
 models should suffice. However, this case is
 fairly unusual and fails to hold in most con-
 sumer choice tasks (e.g., whenever there are
 correlated attribute values or unequal vari-
 ances in payoffs). If options do vary in simi-
 larity or discriminability but all of the
 obviously deficient options have been
 removed, regularity is likely to be satisfied
 although IIA could be violated. In this situa-
 tion, recent random utility models like the
 mixed logit model can be effective. Thus, it
 can happen that multiple theories can pre-
 dict the same violations. For example, both
 mixed logit models and decision field theory
 are capable of explaining similarity effects.
 However, the mixed logit model requires
 differ nt parameters, whereas decision field
 theory can explain these results using the
 s me set of parameters. In this instance,
 deci i n field theory provides a simpler and
more parsimonious explanation. Moreover,
 unlike decision field theory and the leaky,
 competing accumulator model, mixed logit
 models are unable to explain violations of
 the regularity principle. There are many
 consumer choice situations that contain defi-
 cien  options (e.g., a product that is extreme-
 ly overpriced because of its brand name),
 and v olations of regularity would be expect-
 ed. When this occurs, one needs to turn to
more complex models that do not require
 regularity. In sum, only the more complex
 models such as the decision field theory, the
 l aky competing accumulator model, or the
 mix d logit model can explain several of the
 behavior effects that we have reviewed.
 Future work will need to focus on direct
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 comparisons of these models to explore how
 appropriately the models predict human
 behavior.
 Another important principle to consider
 for model selection is generalizability. The
 goal of model selection is to find a theory
 that is capable of predicting not only the
 observed choices in an experiment but also
 other behaviors that are independent of the
 particular experiment used for parameter
 estimation. When predicting new data, sim-
 pler models are often more robust and
 achieve higher levels of accuracy under new
 conditions. This may be particularly impor-
 tant for the design of new products. Simpler
 models, built on psychological principles
 rather than ad hoc parameters, promise to
 be more effective for purposes of generaliza-
 tion. For example, Tversky's (1972b) elimi-
 nation by aspects model provides
 mechanisms to make a priori predictions
 about the effects of new options.
 Is there a proper balance between pre-
 dictability and complexity? The answer
 depends on the application and the circum-
 stances. Descriptive theories should be able
 to predict violations of consistency princi-
 ples when violations are commonplace. A
 review of the literature suggests that viola-
 tions are frequent for all of the principles
 that we examined, except perhaps weak sto-
 chastic transitivity. These violations are
 quite systematic, but relatively rare (cf.
 Mellers and Biagini 1994). In fact, William
 H. Morrison (1963) noted that the theo-
 retical number of intransitive triples in a
 complete set of pairwise comparisons is
 quite limited: Given n options, the maxi-
 mum number of intransitive triples is
 (n + 1)/(4(n -2)). As n increases, the maxi-
 mum number of intransitive triples approach-
 es one fourth. This result implies that even if
 a decision process produces a maximum of
 intransitive choices, the intransitive triples
 will still be relatively atypical. Therefore,
 increasing the complexity of a theory to
 account for violations of weak stochastic
 transitivity appears less justified.
 7.2 When Are Violations of Consistency
 Principles Reasonable?
 We have argued that some violations of
 consistency principles are common. Now we
 address the question of whether these viola-
 tions are reasonable. Rationality is tradition-
 ally defined as compliance with consistency
 principles, and inconsistency implies "irra-
 tionality" (Shafir and Robin A. LeBoeuf
 2002). This approach has been widely chal-
 lenged (e.g., Aumann 1962; Machina 1982;
 Cohen and Jaffray 1988; Gigerenzer 1991,
 1996a, 1996b; Lopes and Oden 1991;
 Hammond 1996; Lopes 1996; McFadden
 1999; Mongin 2000). Selten (2001, p. 15)
 argued that "behavior should not be called
 irrational simply because it fails to conform
 to norms of full rationality" and that "bound-
 ed rationality is not irrationality." Bounded
 rationality is a more accurate description of
 human behavior taking into account that
 people make decisions with limited time,
 knowledge, and computational power. This
 view, initially proposed by Simon (1956,
 1983), recognizes that the lack of compli-
 ance with consistency principles could, in
 fact, be functional. For example, the benefit
 of a quick decision could easily outweigh the
 cost of some inconsistency.
 How reasonable are violations of the five
 consistency principles discussed here? We
 will begin with perfect consistency, a princi-
 ple that follows from deterministic choice
 theories. If individuals had "true" prefer-
 ences, they might find themselves at a dis-
 tinct disadvantage if they deviated from those
 preferences, especially in the long run.
 However, in dynamic environments, where
 individuals are continually faced with new
 sets of options, some degree of variability is
 beneficial for exploring the environment. A
 competitive environment is another case
 where some degree of variability could be
 desirable. The decisionmaker whose choices
 are difficult to forecast has an advantage over
 a predictable opponent. In fact, in zero-sum
 games stochastic decisions, representing
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 mixed strategies, are the only existing Nash
 equilibrium defining optimal behavior. In
 sum, these real-world advantages of vari-
 able preferences could easily carry over into
 artificial stable laboratory settings.
 Numerous studies cast doubt on the idea
 that people possess "true" preferences in the
 sense of fixed utility theories. Instead, the evi-
 dence suggests that people construct or dis-
 cover their preferences when presented with
 option sets. The unfolding of these processes
 depends on the circumstances of the choice
 situation (i.e., the time pressure, the stakes,
 and the way in which preferences are elicit-
 ed) and on the options under consideration
 (i.e., the context and the frame). The attrib-
 utes an individual uses for comparing options
 might depend on the option set. Their rela-
 tive "importance" could depend on the simi-
 larity of attribute values, and thus explain
 comparability effects. Focusing the individ-
 ual's attention on attributes with different val-
 ues seems like an efficient and reasonable
 form of decision making.
 Violations of IIA could also be reasonable.
 For instance, Greene (2000, p. 864) in his
 standard textbook in econometrics writes
 that the principle "is not a particularly
 appealing restriction to place on consumer
 behavior." David Brownstone and Train
 (1999, p. 110) argue that the substitutions
 effects that are implied by the IIA principle
 "can be unrealistic in many settings" and
 McFadden (2001, p. 358) argues that they
 "may not be behaviorally plausible."
 Likewise, Hensher and Greene (2003, p.
 135) regard the principle as "questionable."
 The famous "red-bus blue-bus" example
 described above shows that in many situa-
 tions it appears unreasonable to follow the
 IIA principle. Amartya Sen (1993) presented
 another illustrative example of a decision as to
 whether to take an apple out of a fruit basket
 at a dinner party. A person who behaves
 decently might not take the apple if it is the
 last. But, if more than one apple is left in the
 basket, the same person might take an apple.
 Of course, the additional apples are not really
 "independent" because they change the con-
 sequences of the original option (i.e., norms of
 politeness). However, this is exactly why viola-
 tions of independence occur: When people
 construct their preferences in a choice situa-
 tion, additional options can change the conse-
 quences of other options or the perception of
 these consequences.
 A decision process that constructs or dis-
 covers preferences could also explain viola-
 tions of regularity. The addition of new
 options to a choice set (i.e., adding a less
 attractive option) systematically influences
 preferences for options in the original set,
 violating the regularity principle. These types
 of contextual effects need not be unreason-
 able. When evaluating choice sets, such as
 those in table 2, participants in an experiment
 might infer that a dominated option, such as
 D, was included in the choice set to provide
 useful information (Paul H. Grice 1975,
 1989; see also Denis J. Hilton 1995).
 Participants might infer that laptop comput-
 ers with large displays, such as A, are relative-
 ly uncommon and perhaps less desirable than
 laptop computers with smaller displays, such
 as B and D. If the market for larger displays is
 small, B could be the best choice.
 Birger Wernerfelt (1995) made a similar
 argument by suggesting that people use the
 available options to draw inferences about
 their own tastes and utilities. Decisionmakers
 who know their relative but not their
 absolute utilities could make assumptions
 about the correct choice from the choice set
 if they believed the options reflected popula-
 tion utilities. They would use the market
 offerings to assign utilities and infer their
own preferences. Drazen Prelec, Wernerfelt,
 and Florian Zettelmeyer (1997) developed a
 co xt model that reflects simple infer-
 ences about one's own preferences (ideal
points) given what is available (product
 "addresses"). They generate predictions that
can simulate compromise and attraction
effects. Though promising, their model
 requires additional information (category
 atings) that reflect a decisionmaker's ideal
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 point and his or her perceptions of product
 addresses.
 In sum, the different violations of consis-
 tency principles can be justifiable within a
 "bounded rationality" framework. Bounded
 rationality stresses how choices depend on
 the characteristics of the environment. It also
 stresses how the selection of simple strate-
 gies can be quite adaptive. For example,
 Gigerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein (1996)
 demonstrated that a simple lexicographic
 heuristic provided accurate predictions in a
 paired-comparison inference task. If a
 heuristic is fairly good, it might be beneficial,
 even if it occasionally produces intransitive
 choices. Consistent, Rieskamp and Otto
 (2006) could show that simple heuristics can
 predict individuals' choices quite well.
 Warren Thorngate (1980) and Payne,
 Bettman, and Johnson (1988) demonstrated
 that simple heuristics can also be efficient
 when choosing among options with a flat
 maximum. Another heuristic that can lead to
 intransitivities is the majority rule (e.g.,
 Kenneth O. May 1954; Maya Bar-Hillel and
 Avishai Margalit 1988). With this rule, the
 decisionmaker simply counts the number of
 dimensions where an option has an advan-
 tage (disregarding the magnitude of the
 advantages) and selects the option with the
 greatest number of advantages. By focusing
 only on the relative advantage of an option
 compared to alternative options, the majority
 rule can violate transitivity. Nonetheless,
 these heuristics, such as the lexicographic or
 majority rule, require only a small subset of
 the available information, which is then easy
 to process. Heuristics can be regarded as
 "approximation methods" of more complex
 strategies, and by "using such methods.., we
 implicitly assume that the world is not
 designed to take advantage of our approxi-
 mation methods," whereas experiments are
 often "designed with exactly that goal in
 mind" (Tversky 1969, p. 46).
 The traditional argument that transitivity
 is a cornerstone of rationality is based on
 the observation that a decisionmaker who
 violates the axiom may be "taken" by a
 money pump (see Davidson, John Charles
 C. McKinsey, and Suppes 1955; Robin P.
 Cubitt and Sugden 2001). Being "taken"
 means that a decisionmaker who starts with
 an option and cycles through a series of
 choices, paying each time for a new option,
 will eventually end up with less money and
 the original option. It is unquestionable that
 such intransitive choices are costly and
 unreasonable. However, we do not
 encounter money pumps very often and, if
 we did, we would probably learn to avoid
 them. As experimental results show (Yun-
 Peng Chu and Ruey-Ling Chu 1990), build-
 ing a money pump is not easy because
 people typically recognize their intransitive
 choices and quickly change their behavior.
 Thus, money pump "arguments are logical
 bogeymen" (Lopes 1996, p. 187) that
 demonstrate how irrational behavior in
 principle could occur, but that do not show
 that irrational behavior in fact occurs.
 The regular, systematic, and robust viola-
 tions of consistency set the requirements for
 descriptive theories of choice. The violations
 we have discussed are interrelated in subtle
 and interesting ways; they illustrate system-
 atic behavioral principles. Whether they
 represent rational or irrational behavior
 might be analogous to asking whether the
 glass is half empty or half full. What really
 matters is (1) understanding how and why
 people make choices and (2) being able to
 predict those choices. Debates about ration-
 ality focus attention far too narrowly. A
 broader conversation-one that considers
 reasonable behavior, adaptive behavior, and
 the environment in which choices occur-is
 long overdue. We look forward to this shift
 in focus and the related evidence and theo-
 ries that will unfold in the next several
 decades.
 APPENDICES
 Appendix A: Proof that the elimination by
 aspect theory cannot explain compromise
 effects.
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 Consider a choice set consisting of three
 cameras labeled A, B, and C. A is a high-
 quality camera with many high-quality fea-
 tures and is very expensive; B is a low-quality
 camera with no high-quality features and is
 quite cheap; C is between the two extremes,
 having some, but not all, of the high-quality
 features and is moderately priced. The com-
 promise camera shares some features with
 both extreme options. With the compromise
 effect, p(AI{A,B}) = p(A|{A,C}) = p(BI{B,C}).
 But, when the three options are evaluated
 together, p(C|{A,B,C}) > p(A {A,B,C}) and
 p(CI{A,B,C}) > p(B|{A,B,C}). The compo-
 nential context theory (Tversky and
 Simonson 1993) predicts the compromise
 effect. In contrast, the elimination by aspects
 theory (Tversky 1972b) cannot predict the
 effect, as shown below. In the elimination by
 aspects theory, alternatives are composed of
 common and unique positive aspects:
 a = unique aspects of A,
 b = unique aspects of B,
 c = unique aspects of C,
 ab= common aspects between A and B,
 but not with C,
 ac= common aspects between A and C,
 but not with B, and
 bc= common aspects between B and C,
 but not with A.
 Let u be a scale that assigns a positive
 value to these aspects so that, for instance,
 u(a) represents the positive value of aspects
 a to the decisionmaker. Cameras A and C
 share some high-quality features, whereas
 cameras A and B have little in common so
 that u(ac) > u(ab). Cameras B and C share
 the positive aspect of not being very expen-
 sive, which cameras A and C do not share so
 that u(bc) > u(ab). Thus, on the basis of the
 similarity relations among the choice
 options, it can be assumed that:
 (Al) u(ac) > u(ab) and u(bc) > u(ab).
 These assumptions, regarding the mapping
 from options to similarity relations, are essen-
 tial for EBA to account for the similarity
 effect (see Tversky 1972b). For binary
 choices, EBA predicts:
 (A2)  p(A|{A,B})=
 u(a)
 The compromise effect implies that the
 choice probabilities for the three binary
 choices are equal so that:
 (A3) u(a) + u(ac) = u(b) + u(bc),
 (A4) u(a) + u(ab) = u(c) + u(bc), and
 (A5) u(b) + u(ab) = u(c) + u(ac).
 From (Al) and (A5) it is known that
 u(b) > u(c) and from (Al) and (A4) it is
 known that u(a) > u(c). For triadic choices,
 EBA predicts
 p(AI{A,B,C}) = [u(a) + u(ab) . p(A|{A,B}) +
 u(ac).p(AI{A,C})]/u(K),
 where u(K) = [u(a) + u(b) + u(c) + u(ab) +
 u(ac) + u(bc)]. The compromise effect
 implies
 p(CI{A,B,C}) > p(A {A,B,C}) or
 [u(c) + .5(u(ac) + u(bc))]/u(K) >
 [u(a) + .5(u(ab) + u(ac))]/u(K),
 p(CI{A,B,C}) > p(BJ{A,B,C}) or
 [u(c) + .5(u(ac) + u(bc))]/u(K) >
 [u(b) + .5(u(ab) + u(bc)}]/u(K).
 If both sides of the inequalities are multi-
 plied by 2 and u(K) is cancelled out, the
 result is:
 (A6) [u(c) + u(bc) + u(c) + u(ac)] >
 [u(a) + u(ac) + u(a) + u(ab)],
 (A7) [u(c) + u(bc) + u(c) + u(ac)] >
 [u(b) + u(bc) + u(b) + u(ab)].
 With the substitutions from (A3) and (A4),
 inequality (A7) can be rewritten as
 [u(a) +u(ab) +u(c) +u(ac)] >
 [u(a) + u(ac) + u(b) + u(ab)].
 After canceling on both sides, it is found
 that u(c) > u(b), contradicting the earlier
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 conclusion that u(b) > u(c) from (Al) and
 (A5). Similarly, with the substitutions from
 (A4), inequality (A6) can be rewritten as
 [u(a) + u(ab) + u(c) + u(ac)] >
 [u(a) + u(ac) + u(a) + u(ab)].
 After canceling on both sides, it is found
 that u(c) > u(a), contradicting the earlier
 conclusion that u(a) > u(c) from (Al) and
 (A4). Therefore, EBA cannot predict the
 compromise effect.
 Appendix B: Proof that the componential
 context theory cannot explain similarity
 effects.
 Consider a choice set consisting of three
 cameras labeled A, B, and D. A is a high-qual-
 ity camera with many high-quality features
 and is expensive; B is a low-quality camera
 with no extra features and is very cheap.
 Camera D is a slightly higher-quality camera
 than A; it has more quality features and a
 slightly higher price than A. D is very similar
 to A, and both A and D are quite different
 from B. The similarity effect implies that
 p(AI{A,B}) = p(AI{A,D}) = p(BI{B,D}). But,
 when the three options are evaluated togeth-
 er, either p(BI{A,B,D}) > p(AI{A,B,D}) or
 p(BI{A,B,D}) > p(DI{A,B,D}). The proof that
 the componential context theory cannot pre-
 dict the similarity effect can be demonstrated
 with the first of the two triadic choices.
 The componential context theory is based
 on the idea that people consider the advan-
 tages of one option over those of another.
 Camera A has a higher-quality advantage
 over B and camera B has a higher-price
 advantage over A. The quality advantage of
 A over B is denoted adv(A,B) and the price
 advantage of B over A is denoted adv(B, A).
 For triadic choice sets, the model assumes:
 (BI) p(AI{A,B,D}) = F[V(AI{A,B,D}),
 V(BI{A,B,D}), V(D|{A,B,D})]
 where F is an increasing function of the first
 argument and a decreasing function of the
 second two. Furthermore:
 (B2)  V(AI{A,B,D}) =
 kPkVk(A) + O[R(A,B) + R(A,D)]
 where Y'kfkvk(A) = v(A) represents the value




 where advk(A,B) = Vk(A) - Vk(B) if A has a
 positive advantage over B, and zero other-
 wise, and disk(A,B) = 6[vk(B) -Vk(A)] if
 option A has a disadvantage over B, and zero
 otherwise, and where 6 is a convex function
 consistent with loss aversion so that the
 value for the disadvantage of A over B is
 larger than the corresponding advantage of
 B over A. Convexity is required to explain
 the compromise effect (Tversky and
 Simonson 1993).
 The fact that the binary choices are all
 equal implies: adv(B,D)-=adv(D,B) and
 v(B) = v(D); adv(B,A) = adv(A,B) and v(A)
 = v(B); adv(D,A) = adv(A,D) and v(A)
 = v(D).
 For the similarity effect, as described
 above, the largest advantage on price occurs
 between B and D, the next largest advantage
 occurs between B and A, and the smallest
 advantage occurs between A and D. That is:
 (B4) adv(B,D) > adv(B,A) > adv(A,D).
 To explain the similarity effect we must
 obtain




 (B5) is true when




 But if adv(B,D) > adv(A,D), as in (B4), this
 equation must be false for convex 3 func-
 tions. Thus, the componential context model
 cannot predict the similarity effect.
 Appendix C: Proof that mixed logit models
 satisfy regularity.
 Assume that X is a complete set of options
 and Y is a subset of X(Y C X), that is
 Y= {A1,...,Am} and X= {A1,...,An} with
 n m. Define L(Ai Y; /) as the probability
 that option Ai is chosen from a set Y given a
 fixed set of coefficients P3. For example, L
 may be defined by a mixed logit model with
 random coefficients P (see for example,
 McFadden and Train, 2000). Assume that
 L(Ai Y;1) satisfies regularity. In other words,
 given Y C X, it is assumed that L(Ai Y;13) -
 L(AiJX; ) > 0 for every 13. Then it follows
 that p(AiIY) is given by a probability mixture
 of L(AilY;fl) as defined by the integral over
 the densityf.
 p(AjIY) = JL(Ai Y;P) . f(P)dP.
 Then the difference
 p(AjiY) - p(AIX) =
 JL(AiIY;1) -f(/)d - jL(A IX; P) -f(P)dP=
 J[L(Ai IY;1P) - L(AijX;fP)] . f(f)dp > 0
 is always positive, which implies that
 p(AI|Y) > p(AijX). Therefore the mixed logit
 model satisfies regularity.
 Appendix D: Example of how the mixed
 logit model can explain violations of weak
 stochastic transitivity.
 Assume that Y is a set of options
 Y = {A1,...,A,,}, for instance a number of
 college applicants following Tversky's
 (1969) example. Each candidate i is
 described by three attribute values Xik, intel-
 lectual stability (k = 1), emotional stability
 (k = 2), and social facility (k = 3). Suppose,
 the first candidate has the attribute values
 x1l = 66, x12= 90, and x13= 85, the second
 candidate has the values x21= 78, x22= 70,
 and x,2 = 55, and the third candidate has the
 values xa31= 90, x32= 32, and xa33= 4. We can
 apply the mixed logit model as defined by
 equation 7, such that the choice probability
 when choosing between the first and second
 candidate is
 p(A1I
 For convenience, define vq = exp(kfkq" 'Xik).
 Following the logic of the mixed logit model
 assume the vector of weights, is selected
 with equal probability of 1/3 from the set
 Q= :{(11-= -1, 321= 3.2, P,31= -2.6), (312= 1,
 P22=-3.025, 1P32=2.45), ( A -3=0.2, 123= -0.595, A13=0.51)}. Then, the probability of
 choosing the first candidate when comparing
 the first and second candidate is:
 p(A1{A1,A2}) = [v11/(v11 +V21) +
 v12A/(v12+v22) +v13 /(V13 +V23)]/3
 = [el/(el+ e3) + e2/(e2 + e') +
 e3/(e3 + e2)]/3 = 0.53.
 Correspondingly, the probability of choosing
 the second candidate when comparing the
 second and third candidate can be deter-
 mined, so that p(A21 {A2,A3}) = 0.53 results.
 Finally, when comparing the first and the
 third candidate the probability
 p(A11 {A1,A3}) = .47 results, which violates
 weak stochastic transitivity.
 Appendix E: Proof that the generalized
 extreme value model satisfies weak stochastic
 transitivity.
 Assume that Y is a set of options
 Y = {A1,...,Am}. The generalized extreme
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 value model defines the binary choice
 probability as follows:
 p(AiJ{Ai,Aj})
 exp
 where X is a vector of attributes, P3 is a vec-
 tor of weights assigned to the attributes, and
 0 is as free similarity parameter that depends
 on the similarity between the pair of options
 for each choice set and that can account for
 violations of IIA. Note that
 p(Ai {Ai,Aj1}) > .50 -- p(Aij {Ai,Aj)/p(AjI {Ai,Aj})
 =Sexp(f3Xi/O)
 Therefore if
 p(AiI{A,,Ai1) > .50 and p(AjI{Aj,Ak }) > .50,
 then
 OXi> OX, and fPXj, > -> fPXk PX, > fPXk > ->
 p(AiI{A,,Ak}) > .50.
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